Presidential Legitimacy and Constitutional Competences: A Comparative Study of the President of the Republic in the Greek and Romanian Legal Orders

Abstract

This study examines the institutional divergence between the parliamentary system of Greece and the semi-presidential model of Romania, focusing on the relationship between the Head of State's democratic legitimation and the constitutionally circumscribed nature of his executive powers. The central research enquiry concerns the manner in which distinct historical memory and the concept of "constitutional time" within the two jurisdictions reconfigure the functional architecture of the Executive. Employing a comparative methodology and utilizing the institution's normative ambit as the tertium comparationis, the research adopts a functional approach to analyse how the traumas of an authoritarian past dictated distinct strategies for safeguarding democracy. Regarding the Romanian legal order, the analysis integrates the theoretical construct of "mitigated semi-presidentialism" (Iorgovan, Drăganu) and the jurisprudential acquis of the Constitutional Court (Decisions No. 70/1999 and 567/2006), which delineates the President's role as an "Active Counterweight." It argues that while the President enjoys original (direct) legitimacy, his powers, such as the consultative referendum, are strictly checked to prevent the emergence of a "bicephalous executive" deadlock. Conversely, the Greek constitutional paradigm, shaped by the revisions of 1986 and 2019, favours derivative (indirect) legitimacy to deliberately obviate the perils of "dual legitimacy" (Venizelos). By decoupling the presidential election from parliamentary dissolution, the Greek model consolidates the Unitary Executive, rendering the President a "Dormant Regulator" in the interest of governability. In conclusion, the thesis argues that the two models should not be evaluated hierarchically but functionally, as successful adaptations to their respective national exigencies. Ultimately, the guarantee of democratic stability is not ensured exclusively by "constitutional engineering," but presupposes the constitutional maturity of political actors in managing "cohabitation" and institutional consensus.